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Abstract
This paper is concerned with uniform stabilization and social optimality for general mean field linear quadratic control systems,
where subsystems are coupled via individual dynamics and costs, and the state weight is not assumed with the definiteness
condition. For the finite-horizon problem, we first obtain a set of forward-backward stochastic differential equations (FBSDEs)
from variational analysis, and construct a feedback-type control by decoupling the FBSDEs. For the infinite-horizon problem,
by using solutions to two Riccati equations, we design a set of decentralized control laws, which is further proved to be
asymptotically social optimal. Some equivalent conditions are given for uniform stabilization of the systems in different cases,
respectively. Finally, the proposed decentralized controls are compared to the asymptotic optimal strategies in previous works.
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1 Introduction
Mean field games have drawn increasing attention in
many fields including system control, appliedmathemat-
ics and economics [6], [8], [14]. The mean field game in-
volves a very large population of small interacting play-
ers with the feature that while the influence of each one
is negligible, the impact of the overall population is sig-
nificant. By combining mean field approximations and
individual’s best response, the dimensionality difficulty
is overcome. Mean field games and control have found
wide applications, including smart grids [29], [10], [26],
finance, economics [15], [9], [34], and social sciences [5],
etc.
By now, mean field games have been intensively studied
in the LQ (linear-quadratic) framework [20], [27], [35],
[13], [7], [31]. Huang et al. developed the Nash certainty
equivalence (NCE) based on the fixed-point method and
designed an ǫ-Nash equilibrium for mean field LQ games
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gram of China under Grant 2018YFA0703800, and the Na-
tional Natural Science Foundation of China under Grants
61573221, 61633014, 61773241 and 61877057.
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with discount costs by the NCE approach [20]. The NCE
approach was then applied to the cases with long run
average costs [27] and with Markov jump parameters
[35], respectively. The works [11], [7] employed the ad-
joint equation approach and the fixed-point theorem to
obtain sufficient conditions for the existence of the equi-
librium strategy over a finite horizon. For other aspects
of mean field games, readers are referred to [22], [25],
[41], [11] for nonlinear mean field games, [38] for obliv-
ious equilibrium in dynamic games, [19], [36] for mean
field games with major players, [18], [31] for robust mean
field games.
Besides noncooperative games, social optima in mean
fieldmodels have also attractedmuch interest. The social
optimum control refers to that all the players cooperate
to optimize the common social cost—the sum of individ-
ual costs, which is a type of team decision problem [17].
Huang et al. considered social optima in mean field LQ
control, and provided an asymptotic team-optimal so-
lution [21]. Wang and Zhang [37] investigated the mean
field social optimal problem where the Markov jump pa-
rameter appears as a common source of randomness.
For further literature, see [23] for social optima in mixed
games, [3] for team-optimal control with finite popula-
tion and partial information.
Most previous results on mean field games and control
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were given by using the fixed-point method [20], [27],
[36], [21], [12], [11], [37]. However, the fixed-point analy-
sis (e.g., from the contractionmapping theorem) is some-
times conservative, particularly for high-dimensional
systems. In this paper, we solve the problem by de-
coupling directly high-dimensional forward-backward
stochastic differential equations (FBSDEs). In recent
years, some progress has been made for study of the
optimal LQ control by tackling the FBSDEs. See [42],
[44], [45], [32] for details.
This paper investigates uniform stabilization and social
optimality for linear quadratic mean field control sys-
tems, where subsystems (agents) are coupled via dynam-
ics and individual costs. The state weight Q is not lim-
ited to positive semi-definite. This model can be taken as
a generation of robust mean field control problems [18],
[31], [33]. Since the weight Q in the cost functional is
indefinite, the prior boundedness of the state is not im-
plied directly by the finiteness of the cost, which brings
about additional difficulty to show the social optimality
of decentralized control.
For the finite-horizon social control problem, we first ob-
tain a set of FBSDEs by examining the variation of the
social cost, and give a centralized feedback-type control
laws by decoupling the FBSDEs. With mean field ap-
proximations, we design a set of decentralized control
laws. By exploiting the uniform convexity property of the
problem, the decentralized controls are further shown
to have asymptotic social optimality. For the infinite-
horizon case, we design a set of decentralized control
laws by using solutions of two Riccati equations, which is
shown to be asymptotically social optimal. Some equiv-
alent conditions are further given for uniform stabiliza-
tion of all the subsystems when the state weight Q is
positive semi-definite or only symmetric. Furthermore,
the explicit expressions of optimal social costs are given
in terms of the solutions to two Riccati equations, and
the proposed decentralized control laws are compared to
the feedback strategies in previous works. Finally, some
numerical examples are given to illustrate the effective-
ness of the proposed control laws.
The main contributions of the paper are summarized as
follows.
• We first obtain necessary and sufficient existence con-
ditions of finite-horizon centralized optimal control by
variational analysis, and then design a feedback-type
decentralized control by tackling FBSDEs with mean
field approximations.
• In the case Q ≥ 0, the necessary and sufficient con-
ditions are given for uniform stabilization of the sys-
tems with the help of the system’s observability and
detectability.
• In the case that Q is indefinite, the necessary and
sufficient conditions are given for uniform stabilization
of the systems using the Hamiltonian matrices.
• The asymptotically optimal decentralized controls are
obtained under very basic assumptions (without ver-
ifying the fixed-point condition). The corresponding
social costs are explicitly given by virtue of the solu-
tions to two Riccati equations.
The organization of the paper is as follows. In Section
II, the socially optimal control problem is formulated. In
Section III, we construct asymptotically optimal decen-
tralized control laws by tackling FBSDEs for the finite-
horizon case. In Section IV, for the infinite-horizon case,
the asymptotically optimal controls are designed and an-
alyzed, and some equivalent conditions are further given
for uniform stabilization in different cases. In Section V,
some numerical examples are given to show the effective-
ness of the proposed control laws. Section VI concludes
the paper.
The following notation will be used throughout this
paper. ‖ · ‖ denotes the Euclidean vector norm or
Frobenius matrix norm. For a vector z and a ma-
trix Q, ‖z‖2Q = zTQz, tr(Q) is the trace of the ma-
trix Q, and Q > 0 (Q ≥ 0) means that Q is posi-
tive definite (positive semidefinite). For two vectors
x, y, 〈x, y〉 = xT y. C([0, T ],Rn) is the space of all
R
n-valued continuous functions defined on [0, T ], and
Cρ/2([0,∞),Rn) is a subspace of C([0,∞),Rn) which
is given by {f | ∫∞
0
e−ρt‖f(t)‖2dt <∞}. L2F(0, T ;Rk) is
the space of all F -adapted Rk-valued processes x(·) such
that E
∫ T
0
‖x(t)‖2dt < ∞. For convenience of presen-
tation, we use C,C1, C2, · · · to denote generic positive
constants, which may vary from place to place.
2 Problem Description
Consider a large population systems with N agents.
Agent i evolves by the following stochastic differential
equation:
dxi(t) = [Axi(t) +Bui(t) +Gx
(N)(t) + f(t)]dt
+ σ(t)dWi(t), 1 ≤ i ≤ N,
(1)
where xi ∈ Rn and ui ∈ Rr are the state and
input of the ith agent. x(N)(t) = 1N
∑N
j=1 xj(t),
f, σ ∈ Cρ/2([0,∞),Rn). {Wi(t), 1 ≤ i ≤ N} are
a sequence of independent 1-dimensional Brown-
ian motions on a complete filtered probability space
(Ω,F , {Ft}0≤t≤T ,P). The cost function of agent i is
given by
Ji(u) = E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
{∥∥xi(t)− Γx(N)(t)− η(t)∥∥2Q
+ ‖ui(t)‖2R
}
dt,
(2)
where ρ > 0 and Q, R are symmetric matrices with ap-
propriate dimensions. Q is allowed to be indefinite. R >
0, and η ∈ Cρ/2([0,∞),Rn). Denote u = {u1, . . . , uN}.
The decentralized control set is given by
Ud,i =
{
ui
∣∣ ui(t) is adapted to σ(xi(s), 0 ≤ s ≤ t),
E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt‖ui(t)‖2dt <∞
}
.
2
For comparison, define the centralized control sets as
Uc,i =
{
ui
∣∣ ui(t) is adapted to σ{ N⋃
i=1
F it},
E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt‖ui(t)‖2dt <∞
}
,
and Uc=
{
(u1, · · · , uN)
∣∣ui belongs to Uc,i, 1 ≤ i ≤ N},
where F it = σ(xi(0),Wi(s), 0 ≤ s ≤ t), i = 1, · · · , N .
In this paper, we mainly study the following problem.
(P). Seek a set of decentralized control laws to optimize
social cost for the system (1)-(2), i.e., infui∈Ud,i Jsoc,
where Jsoc =
∑N
i=1 Ji(u).
Remark 2.1 The related results can be extended to the
case of multidimensional Brownian motions trivially.
Here we consider that σ(t) is time-varying and satisfies
some growth rate. For convenience of the statement, we
assume Wi is scalar and σ ∈ Cρ/2([0,∞),Rn). For the
finite-horizon problem, our results still hold for the case
that the matrices A,B,G, · · · depend on t.
Assume
A1) The initial states of agents xi(0), i = 1, ..., N are
mutually independent and have the same mathematical
expectation. xi(0) = xi0, Exi(0) = x¯0, i = 1, · · · , N .
There exists a constant C0 (independent ofN) such that
max1≤i≤N E‖xi(0)‖2 < C0.
3 The finite-horizon problem
For the convenience of design, we first consider the fol-
lowing finite-horizon problem.
(P1) inf
u∈L2
F
(0,T ;Rnr)
JFsoc(u),
where JFsoc(u) =
∑N
i=1 J
F
i (u) and Ft = σ{
⋃N
i=1 F it}.
Here
JFi (u) = E
∫ T
0
e−ρt
{∥∥xi(t)− Γx(N)(t)− η(t)∥∥2Q
+ ‖ui(t)‖2R
}
dt.
(3)
We first give equivalent conditions for the convexity of
(P1).
Proposition 3.1 (i) Problem (P1) is convex in u if and
only if for any ui ∈ L2F(0, T ;Rr), i = 1, · · · , N ,
N∑
i=1
E
∫ T
0
e−ρt
{∥∥yi(t)− Γy(N)(t)∥∥2Q + ‖ui(t)‖2R
}
dt ≥ 0,
where y(N) =
∑N
j=1 yj/N and yi satisfies
dyi(t) = [Ayi(t) +Gy
(N)(t) +Bui(t)]dt,
yi(0) = 0, i = 1, 2, · · · , N. (4)
(ii) Problem (P1) is uniformly convex in u if and only if
for any ui ∈ L2F(0, T ;Rr), there exists γ > 0 such that
N∑
i=1
E
∫ T
0
e−ρt
{∥∥yi(t)− Γy(N)(t)∥∥2Q + ‖ui(t)‖2R
}
dt
≥γ
N∑
i=1
E
∫ T
0
e−ρt‖ui(t)‖2dt.
Proof. Let xi and x´i be the state processes of agent iwith
the control v and v´, respectively. Take any λ1 ∈ [0, 1]
and let λ2 = 1− λ1. Then
λ1J
F
soc(v) + λ2J
F
soc(v´)− JFsoc(λ1v + λ2v´)
=λ1λ2
N∑
i=1
E
∫ T
0
{‖xi(t)−x´i(t)−Γ(x(N)(t)−x´(N)(t))‖2Q
+ ‖vi(t)− v´i(t)‖2R
}
dt.
Denote u = v − v´, and yi = xi − x´i. Thus, yi satisfies
(4). By the definition of (uniform) convexity, the lemma
follows. ✷
By examining the variation of JFsoc, we obtain the nece-
ssary and sufficient conditions for the existence of cen-
tralized optimal control of (P1). To simplify the presen-
tation later, we denote by
{
Ξ
∆
= ΓTQ+QΓ− ΓTQΓ,
η¯
∆
= Qη − ΓTQη.
Theorem 3.1 Suppose R > 0. Then (P1) has a set of
optimal control laws if and only if Problem (P1) is convex
in u and the following equation system admits a set of
solutions (xi, pi, β
j
i , i, j = 1, · · · , N):

dxi(t) =
(
Axi(t)−BR−1BT pi(t)+Gx(N)(t)+f(t)
)
dt
+ σ(t)dWi(t),
dpi(t) =−
[
(A− ρI)T pi(t) +GT p(N)(t) +Qxi(t)
]
dt
+
[
Ξx(N)(t) + η¯(t)
]
dt+
N∑
j=1
βji (t)dWj(t),
xi(0) =xi0, pi(T ) = 0, i = 1, · · · , N,
(5)
where p(N)(t) = 1N
∑N
i=1 pi(t), and furthermore the op-
timal control is given by uˇi(t) = −R−1BT pi(t).
Proof. Suppose that uˇi = −R−1BT pi,where (pi, βji , i, j =
1, · · · , N) is a set of solutions to the equation system
dpi(t) = αi(t)dt+ β
i
i(t)dWi(t) +
∑
j 6=i
βji (t)dWj(t),
pi(T ) = 0, i = 1, · · · , N.
(6)
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Here αi, i = 1, · · · , N are to be determined. Denote by
xˇi the state of agent i under the control uˇi. For any
ui ∈ L2F(0, T ;Rr) and θ ∈ R (θ 6= 0), let uθi = uˇi + θui.
Denote by xθi the solution of the following perturbed
state equation
dxθi (t) =
[
Axθi (t) +B(uˇi(t) + θui(t)) + f(t)
+
G
N
N∑
i=1
xθi (t)
]
dt+ σ(t)dWi(t),
xθi (0) =xi0, i = 1, 2, · · · , N.
Let yi = (x
θ
i − xˇi)/θ. It can be verified that yi satisfies
(4). Then by Itoˆ’s formula, for any i = 1, · · · , N ,
0 =E[〈e−ρT pi(T ), yi(T )〉 − 〈pi(0), yi(0)〉]
=E
∫ T
0
e−ρt
[〈αi(t), yi(t)〉 + 〈pi(t), (A − ρI)yi(t)
+Gy(N)(t) +Bui(t)〉
]
dt,
which implies
0 =
N∑
i=1
E
∫ T
0
e−ρt
[〈αi(t), yi(t)〉+ 〈pi(t), (A− ρI)yi(t)
+Gy(N)(t) +Bui(t)
〉]
dt
=
N∑
i=1
E
∫ T
0
e−ρt
[〈αi(t) + (A− ρI)T pi(t), yi(t)〉
+ 〈GT p(N)(t), yi(t)〉+ 〈BT pi(t), ui(t)〉
]
dt.
(7)
From (3), we have
JFsoc(uˇ+ θu)− JFsoc(uˇ) = 2θI1 + θ2I2 (8)
where uˇ = (uˇ1, · · · , uˇN), and
I1
∆
=
N∑
i=1
E
∫ T
0
e−ρt
[〈
Q
(
xˇi(t)− (Γxˇ(N)(t) + η)
)
,
yi(t)− Γy(N)(t)
〉
+ 〈Ruˇi(t), ui(t)〉
]
dt,
I2
∆
=
N∑
i=1
E
∫ T
0
e−ρt
[∥∥yi(t)−Γy(N)(t)∥∥2Q + ‖ui(t)‖2R]dt.
Note that (suppressing the time t)
N∑
i=1
E
∫ T
0
e−ρt
〈
Q
(
xˇi − (Γxˇ(N) + η)
)
,Γy(N)
〉
dt
=E
∫ T
0
e−ρt
〈
ΓTQ
N∑
i=1
(
xˇi−(Γxˇ(N)+η)
)
,
1
N
N∑
j=1
yj
〉
dt
=
N∑
j=1
E
∫ T
0
e−ρt
〈ΓTQ
N
N∑
i=1
(
xˇi − (Γxˇ(N) + η)
)
, yj
〉
dt
=
N∑
j=1
E
∫ T
0
e−ρt
〈
ΓTQ
(
(I − Γ)xˇ(N) − η), yj〉dt.
From (7), one can obtain that
I1 =
N∑
i=1
E
∫ T
0
e−ρt
〈
Ruˇi +B
T pi, ui
〉
dt
+
N∑
i=1
E
∫ T
0
e−ρt
〈
Q
(
xˇi − (Γxˇ(N) + η)
)
− ΓTQ((I − Γ)xˇ(N) − η)+ αi
+ (A− ρI)T pi +GT p(N), yi
〉
dt. (9)
From (8), uˇ is a minimizer to Problem (P1) if and only
if I2 ≥ 0 and I1 = 0. By Proposition 3.1, I2 ≥ 0 if and
only if (P1) is convex. I1 = 0 is equivalent to
αi =−
[
(A− ρI)T pi − ΓTQ
(
(I − Γ)xˇ(N) − η)
+Q
(
xˇi − (Γxˇ(N) + η)) +GT p(N)
]
,
uˇi =−R−1BT pi.
Thus, we have the optimality system (5). This implies
that (5) admits a solution (xˇi, pˇi, βˇ
j
i , i, j = 1, · · · , N).
On other hand, if the equation system (5) admits a solu-
tion (xˇi, pˇi, βˇ
j
i , i, j = 1, · · · , N). Let uˇi = −R−1BT pˇi. If
(P1) is convex, then uˇ is a minimizer to Problem (P1). ✷
It follows from (5) that


dx(N)(t)=
[
(A+G)x(N)(t)−BR−1BT p(N)(t)+f(t)]dt
+
1
N
N∑
i=1
σ(t)dWi(t),
dp(N)(t) =−
[
(A+G− ρI)T p(N)(t)
+ (I − Γ)TQ(I − Γ)x(N)(t)− η¯(t)
]
dt
+
1
N
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
βji (t)dWj(t),
x(N)(0) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
xi0, p
(N)(T ) = 0.
(10)
Let pi(t) = P (t)xi(t) +K(t)x
(N)(t) + s(t), t ≥ 0. Then
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by (5), (10) and Itoˆ’s formula (suppressing the time t),
dpi = P˙xidt+ P
[(
Axi −BR−1BT (Pxi +Kx(N) + s)
+Gx(N) + f
)
dt+ σdWi
]
+ (s˙+ K˙x(N))dt
+K
{[
(A+G)x(N) −BR−1BT ((P +K)x(N)
+ s) + f
]
dt+
1
N
N∑
i=1
σdWi
}
= − [(A− ρI)T (Pxi +Kx(N) + s)
+GT ((P +K)x(N) + s)
+Qxi − Ξx(N) − η¯
]
dt+
N∑
j=1
βji dWj .
This implies βii =
1
NKσ + Pσ, β
j
i =
1
NKσ, j 6= i,
ρP (t) =P˙ (t) +ATP (t) + P (t)A+Q
−P (t)BR−1BTP (t), P (T ) = 0, (11)
ρK(t)= K˙(t)+(A+G)TK(t)+K(t)(A+G)+GTP (t)
+P (t)G− (P (t) +K(t))BR−1BT (P (t) +K(t))
+P (t)BR−1BTP (t)− Ξ, K(T ) = 0, (12)
ρs(t) = s˙(t) + [A+G−BR−1BT (P +K)]T s(t)
+(P +K)f(t)− η¯(t), s(T ) = 0.
(13)
Remark 3.1 Note that (11) is not a standard Ric-
cati equation. Its solvability may be referred to [1].
In particular, by Theorem 4.3 in [28, Chapter 2], if
det
{
[0, I]eAt
[
0
I
]}
> 0withA =
[
A− ρ2I −BR−1BT
−Q −AT + ρ2I
]
,
then we have
P (t) =
{
[0, I]eAt
[
0
I
]}−1{
[0, I]eAt
[
I
0
]}
.
Remark 3.2 Denote Π = P +K. Then from (11) and
(12), Π satisfies
ρΠ(t) = Π˙(t) + (A+G)TΠ(t) + Π(t)(A +G)
−Π(t)BR−1BTΠ(t) + (I − Γ)TQ(I − Γ). (14)
with Π(T ) = 0. By [32, Theorem 4.5], the solvability of
(11) and (12) is equivalent to the uniform convexity of
two optimal control problems. Particularly, if Q ≥ 0,
then (11) and (12) admit a unique solution, respectively.
Theorem 3.2 Assume A1) holds, and (11)-(12) admit
a solution, respectively. Then (P1) has an optimal control
uˇi(t) = −R−1BT [P (t)xi(t) +K(t)x(N)(t) + s(t)],
where P,K and s are determined by (11)-(13).
To prove Theorem 3.2, we first provide a lemma, which
plays a key role in the later analysis.
Lemma 3.1 If (11) and (12) admit a solution, respec-
tively, then Problem (P1) is uniformly convex.
Proof. By (11), (14), and direct calculations, we have
N∑
i=1
E
∫ T
0
e−ρt
(∥∥yi(t)− Γy(N)(t)∥∥2Q + ‖ui(t)‖2R
)
dt
=
N∑
i=1
E
∫ T
0
e−ρt
(
‖yi(t)‖2Q + ‖y(N)(t)‖2Ξ + ‖ui(t)‖2R
)
dt
=
N∑
i=1
E
∫ T
0
e−ρt
(
‖yi(t)− y(N)(t)‖2Q + ‖y(N)(t)‖2Q−Ξ
+ ‖ui(t)− u(N)(t)‖2R + ‖u(N)(t)‖2R
)
dt
=
N∑
i=1
E
∫ T
0
e−ρt
(∥∥ui(t)− u(N)(t)
+R−1BTP (t)(yi(t)− y(N)(t))
∥∥2
R
+
∥∥u(N)(t) +R−1BTΠ(t)y(N)(t)∥∥2
R
)
dt
≥
N∑
i=1
E
∫ T
0
e−ρt
(∥∥ui(t) +R−1BTP (t)(yi(t)− y(N)(t))
+R−1BTΠ(t)y(N)(t)
∥∥2
R
)
dt
≥γ
N∑
i=1
E
∫ T
0
e−ρt‖ui(t)‖2dt,
where the last line follows by [32, Lemma 2.3]. From
Proposition 3.1, the lemma follows. ✷
Proof of Theorem 3.2. Since (11) and (12) have a
solution, respectively, then by [28, Chapter 2, §4],
(10) admits a unique solution. Thus, the FBSDE
(5) is decoupled and the existence of a solution fol-
lows. From Lemma 3.1, (P1) is uniformly convex. By
Theorem 3.1, (P1) has an optimal control given by
uˇi(t) = −R−1BT [P (t)xi(t) +K(t)x(N)(t) + s(t)], t ≥ 0,
where P,K and s are determined by (11)-(13). ✷
As an approximation to x(N) in (10), we obtain
dx¯
dt
=(A+G)x¯(t)−BR−1BT (Π(t)x¯(t) + s(t))
+ f(t), x¯(0) = x¯0.
(15)
Then, by Theorem 3.2, the decentralized control law for
agent i may be taken as
uˆi(t) =−R−1BT [P (t)xˆi(t) +K(t)x¯(t) + s(t)],
0 ≤ t ≤ T, i = 1, · · · , N, (16)
where P,K, and s are determined by (11)-(13), and x¯
and xˆi respectively satisfy (15) and
dxˆi(t) =
[
(A−BR−1BTP (t))xˆi(t) +Gxˆ(N)(t) + f(t)
−BR−1BT (K(t)x¯(t) + s(t))]dt+ σ(t)dWi(t).
(17)
Remark 3.3 Here, we firstly obtain the centralized
open-loop solution by variational analysis. By tackling
the coupled FBSDEs combined with mean field approx-
imations, the decentralized control laws are designed.
Note that in this case s and x¯ are fully decoupled and no
fixed-point equation is needed.
Theorem 3.3 Assume that A1) holds, and (11)-(12)
admit a solution, respectively. The set of decentralized
control laws {uˆ1, · · · , uˆN} in (16) has asymptotic social
optimality, i.e.,
∣∣∣ 1
N
JFsoc(uˆ)−
1
N
inf
u∈L2
F
(0,T ;Rnr)
JFsoc(u)
∣∣∣ = O( 1√
N
),
and the corresponding social cost is given by
JFsoc(uˆ) =
N∑
i=1
E
{∥∥xi0 − x(N)(0)∥∥2P + ∥∥x(N)(0)∥∥2Π
+ 2sT (0)x(N)(0)
}
+NqT +NǫT , (18)
where
qT =
∫ T
0
e−ρt
[‖σ(t)‖2P (t) + ‖σ(t)‖2Π(t)
− ‖BT s(t)‖2R−1 + 2sT (t)f(t)
]
dt, (19)
ǫT =E
∫ T
0
e−ρt‖BTK(t)(x(N)(t)−x¯(t))‖2R−1dt. (20)
Proof. See Appendix A. ✷
4 The infinite-horizon problem
Based on the analysis in Section 3, we may design the
following decentralized control laws for Problem (P):
uˆi(t) =−R−1BT [P xˆi(t) + (Π− P )x¯(t) + s(t)],
t ≥ 0, i = 1, · · · , N, (21)
where P and Π are maximal solutions 1 to the equations
ρP =ATP + PA− PBR−1BTP +Q, (22)
ρΠ =(A+G)TΠ+Π(A +G)−ΠBR−1BTΠ+Q− Ξ,
(23)
1 For a Riccati equation (e.g., (22)), P is called a maximal
solution if for any solutions P ′, P − P ′ ≥ 0.
and s, x¯ ∈ Cρ/2([0,∞),Rn) are determined by
ρs(t)=s˙(t)+(A+G−BR−1BTΠ)T s(t)+Πf(t)− η¯(t),
(24)
˙¯x(t) =(A+G)x¯(t)−BR−1BT (Πx¯(t) + s(t))
+ f(t), x¯(0) = x¯0. (25)
Here s(0) is to be determined, and the existence condi-
tions of P,Π, s and x¯ need to be investigated further.
4.1 Uniform stabilization of subsystems
We now list some basic assumptions for reference:
A2) The system (A − ρ2I, B) is stabilizable, and (A +
G − ρ2I, B) is stabilizable. Particularly, A¯ + G − ρ2I is
Hurwitz, where A¯
∆
= A−BR−1BTP .
A3) Q ≥ 0, (A − ρ2I,
√
Q) is observable, and (A+G −
ρ
2I,
√
Q(I − Γ)) is observable.
Assumptions A2) and A3) are basic in the study of the
LQ optimal control problem. We will show that under
some conditions, A2) is also necessary for uniform stabi-
lization of multiagent systems. In many cases, A3) may
be weakened to the following assumption.
A3′) Q ≥ 0, (A− ρ2I,
√
Q) is detectable, and (A+G−
ρ
2I,
√
Q(I − Γ)) is detectable.
Lemma 4.1 Under A2)-A3), (22) and (23) admit
unique solutions P > 0,Π > 0, respectively, and
(24)-(25) admits a set of unique solutions s, x¯ ∈
Cρ/2([0,∞),Rn).
Proof. FromA2)-A3) and [2], (22) and (23) admit unique
solutions P > 0,Π > 0 such that A − BR−1BTP − ρ2I
and A+G−BR−1BTΠ− ρ2I are Hurwitz, respectively.
From an argument in [36, Appendix A], we obtain s ∈
Cρ/2([0,∞),Rn) if and only if
s(t) =
∫ ∞
t
e−(A+G−BR
−1BTΠ−ρI)(t−τ)(Πf(τ)−η¯(τ))dτ.
✷
Lemma 4.2 Let A1)-A3) hold. Then for Problem (P),
E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt‖xˆ(N)(t)− x¯(t)‖2dt = O( 1
N
), (26)
where xˆ(N) =
∑N
i=1 xˆi, and x¯ satisfies (25).
Proof. See Appendix B. ✷
It is shown that the decentralized control laws (16) uni-
formly stabilize the systems (1) .
Theorem 4.1 Let A1)-A3) hold. Then for any N ,
N∑
i=1
E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
(‖xˆi(t)‖2 + ‖uˆi(t)‖2) dt <∞. (27)
Proof. See Appendix B. ✷
We now give two equivalent conditions for uniform sta-
bilization of multiagent systems.
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Theorem 4.2 Let A3) hold. Assume that (22)-(23) ad-
mit symmetric solutions. Then for Problem (P) the fol-
lowing statements are equivalent:
(i) For any initial condition (xˆ1(0), · · · , xˆN (0)) satisfy-
ing A1),
N∑
i=1
E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
(‖xˆi(t)‖2 + ‖uˆi(t)‖2) dt <∞. (28)
(ii) Equations (22) and (23) admit unique maximal solu-
tions such that P > 0,Π > 0, and A¯+G− ρ2I is Hurwitz.
(iii) A2) holds.
Proof. See the Appendix C. ✷
For G = 0, we have a simplified version of Theorem 4.2.
Corollary 1 Assume that A3) holds and G = 0. As-
sume that (22)-(23) admit symmetric solutions. Then
the following statements are equivalent:
(i) For any (xˆ1(0), · · · , xˆN (0)) satisfying A1),
N∑
i=1
E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
(‖xˆi(t)‖2 + ‖uˆi(t)‖2) dt <∞.
(ii) Equations (22) and (23) admit unique maximal so-
lutions such that P > 0,Π > 0, respectively.
(iii) A2) holds.
When A3) is weakened to A3′), we have the following
equivalent conditions of uniform stabilization.
Theorem 4.3 Let A3′) hold. Assume that (22)-(23)
admit solutions. Then the following are equivalent:
(i) For any initials (xˆ1(0), · · · , xˆN (0)) satisfying A1),
N∑
i=1
E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
(‖xˆi(t)‖2 + ‖uˆi(t)‖2) dt <∞.
(ii) Equations (22) and (23) admit unique maximal so-
lutions P ≥ 0,Π ≥ 0, and A¯+G− ρ2I is Hurwitz.
(iii) A2) holds.
Proof. See the Appendix C. ✷
For the more general case that Q are indefinite, we have
the following equivalent conditions for uniform stabiliza-
tion of all the subsystems. Assume
A3′′) bothM1 andM2 have no eigenvalues on the imag-
inary axis, where
M1 =
[
A− ρ2I BR−1BT
Q −AT + ρ2I
]
,
M2 =
[
A+G− ρ2I BR−1BT
Q− Ξ −(A+G)T + ρ2I
]
.
Theorem 4.4 Assume that A3′′) holds, and (22)-(23)
admit solutions. Then the following are equivalent:
(i) For any (xˆ1(0), · · · , xˆN (0)) satisfying A1),
N∑
i=1
E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
(‖xˆi(t)‖2 + ‖uˆi(t)‖2) dt <∞.
(ii) Equations (22) and (23) admit unique ρ-stabilizing
solutions 2 (which are also the maximal solutions), and
A¯+G− ρ2I is Hurwitz.
(iii) A2) holds.
Remark 4.1 M1 and M2 are Hamiltonian matrices.
The Hamiltonian matrix plays a significant role in study-
ing general algebraic Riccati equations. See more details
of the property of Hamiltonian matrices in [1], [30].
Remark 4.2 For the caseQ = 0 andG = 0, the Hamil-
tonian matrices reduce to
M1 =M2 =
[
A− ρ2I BR−1BT
0 −AT + ρ2I
]
.
Then it follows from Theorem 4.4 that if A − ρ2I have
no eigenvalues on the imaginary axis, the decentralized
controls (16) uniformly stabilize the systems (1) if and
only if (A − ρ2I, B) is stabilizable. Since Q = 0 and A−
ρ
2I is not Hurwitz necessarily, the system (A− ρ2I,
√
Q)
is not detectable, which implies that the assumptions of
Theorem 4.3 in [21] does not hold.
To show Theorem 4.4, we need two lemmas. The first
lemma is copied from [30, Theorem 6].
Lemma 4.3 Equations (22) and (23) admit unique ρ-
stabilizing solutions (which are also the maximal solu-
tions) if and only if A2) and A3′′) hold.
Lemma 4.4 Let A1) hold. Assume that (22) and (23)
admit ρ-stabilizing solutions, respectively, and A¯+G− ρ2I
is Hurwitz. Then
N∑
i=1
E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
(‖xˆi(t)‖2 + ‖uˆi(t)‖2) dt <∞.
Proof. From the definition of ρ-stabilizing solutions, A−
BR−1BTP − ρ2I and A+G−BR−1BTΠ− ρ2I are Hur-
witz. By the argument in the proof of Theorem 4.1, the
lemma follows. ✷
Proof of Theorem 4.4. By using Lemmas 4.3 and 4.4
together with a similar argument in the proof of Theorem
4.1, the theorem follows. ✷
Example 1 Consider a scalar system withA = a,B =
b, G = g, Q = q, Γ = γ, R = r > 0. Then
M1 =
[
a− ρ/2 b2/r
q −a+ ρ/2
]
,
2 For a Riccati equation (22), P is called a ρ-stabilizing
solution if P satisfies (22) and all the eigenvalues of A −
BR−1BTP − ρ
2
I are in left half-plane.
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M2 =
[
a+ g − ρ/2 b2/r
q(1− γ)2 −(a+ g − ρ/2)
]
.
By direct computations, neither M1 nor M2 has eigen-
values in the imaginary axis if and only if
(a− ρ
2
)2 +
b2
r
q > 0, (29)
(a+ g − ρ
2
)2 +
b2
r
(1 − γ)2q > 0. (30)
Note that if q > 0 (or a − ρ/2 < 0, q = 0), i.e., (a −
ρ/2,
√
q) is observable (detectable), then (29) holds, and
if (1 − γ)2q > 0 (a + g − ρ/2 < 0, q = 0), i.e., (a +
g − ρ/2,√q(1− γ)) is observable (detectable), then (30)
holds.
For this model, the Riccati equation (22) is written as
b2
r
p2 − (2a− ρ)p− q = 0. (31)
Let ∆ = 4[(a− ρ/2)2+ b2q/r]. If (29) holds then ∆ > 0,
which implies (31) admits two solutions. If q > 0 then
(31) has a unique positive solution such that a− b2p/r−
ρ/2 = −
√
∆/2 < 0. If q = 0 and a − ρ/2 < 0 then
(31) has a unique non-negative solution p = 0 such that
a− b2p/r − ρ/2 = a− ρ/2 < 0.
Assume that (29) and (30) hold. By Theorem 4.4, the
system is uniformly stable if and only if (a − ρ/2, b) is
stabilizable (i.e., b 6= 0 or a− ρ/2 < 0), and a− b2p/r−
ρ/2+g < 0. Note that a− b2p/r−ρ/2 < 0. When g ≤ 0,
we have a− b2p/r − ρ/2 + g < 0.
Example 2 We further consider the model in Example
1 for the case that a+ g = ρ/2 and γ = 1 (i.e., (30) does
not hold). In this case, the Riccati equation (23) admits a
unique solution Π = 0. (24) becomes ρs(t) = s˙(t)+ ρ2s(t)
and has a unique solution s(t) ≡ 0 in Cρ/2([0,∞),R).
Thus, x¯ satisfies
dx¯
dt
=
ρ
2
x¯(t) + f(t). (32)
Assume that f is a constant. Then (32) does not admit
a solution in Cρ/2([0,∞),R) unless x¯(0) = −2f/ρ.
4.2 Asymptotic social optimality
Now we are in a position to state the asymptotic opti-
mality of the decentralized control.
Theorem 4.5 Let A1)-A3) hold. For Problem (P), the
set of decentralized control laws {uˆ1, · · · , uˆN} given by
(21) has asymptotic social optimality, i.e.,
∣∣∣ 1
N
Jsoc(uˆ)− 1
N
inf
u∈Uc
Jsoc(u)
∣∣∣ = O(1/√N).
Proof. We first prove that for u ∈ Uc, Jsoc(u) < NC1
implies that
N∑
i=1
E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt(‖xi(t)‖2 + ‖ui(t)‖2)dt < NC2, (33)
for all i = 1, · · · , N . From Jsoc(u) < NC1, we have∑N
i=1 E
∫∞
0 e
−ρt‖ui(t)‖2dt < NC and
N∑
i=1
E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
∥∥xi(t)− Γx(N)(t)∥∥2Qdt < NC, (34)
which further implies that
E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
∥∥(I − Γ)x(N)(t)∥∥2
Q
≤ 1
N
N∑
i=1
E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
∥∥xi(t)− Γx(N)(t)∥∥2Qdt < C.
(35)
By (1) we have
dx(N)(t) =
[
(A+G)x(N)(t) +Bu(N)(t) + f(t)
]
dt
+
1
N
N∑
i=1
σ(t)dWi(t),
which leads to for any r ∈ [0, 1],
x(N)(t) = e(A+G)rx(N)(t− r)
+
∫ t
t−r
e(A+G)(t−τ)[Bu(N)(τ) + f(τ)]dτ
+
1
N
N∑
i=1
∫ t
t−r
e(A+G)(t−τ)σ(τ)dWi(τ).
(36)
By Jsoc(u) < C1 and basic SDE estimates, we can find
a constant C such that
E
∫ ∞
r
e−ρt
∥∥∥ ∫ t
t−r
e(A+G)(t−τ)Bu(N)(τ)dτ
∥∥∥2dt ≤ C.
From (35) and (36) we obtain
E
∫ ∞
r
e−ρt[x(N)(t− r)]T e(A+G)T r(I − Γ)TQ(I − Γ)
· e(A+G)rx(N)(t− r)dt ≤ C,
which implies that for any r ∈ [0, 1],
E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt[x(N)(τ)]T e(A+G)
T r(I − Γ)TQ(I − Γ)
· e(A+G)rx(N)(τ)dτ ≤ C.
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By taking integrationwith respect to r ∈ [0, 1], we obtain
E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt[x(N)(τ)]T
[ ∫ 1
0
e(A+G)
T r(I − Γ)TQ(I − Γ)
· e(A+G)rdr
]
x(N)(τ)dτ ≤ C.
This together with A3) lead to
E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt‖x(N)(t)‖2dt < C, (37)
which with (34) further gives
N∑
i=1
E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt‖xi(t)‖2Qdt < NC. (38)
By (1), we have
xi(t) = e
Arxi(t− r)
+
∫ t
t−r
eA(t−τ)[Bui(τ) + f(τ) +Gx(N)(τ)]dτ
+
∫ t
t−r
eA(t−τ)σ(τ)dWi(τ).
(39)
It follows from (37) that
E
∫ ∞
r
e−ρt
∥∥∥ ∫ t
t−r
eA(t−τ)Gx(N)(τ)dτ
∥∥∥2dt
≤E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρτ‖Gx(N)(τ)‖2
∫ r
0
∥∥e(A− ρ2 I)v∥∥2dvdτ ≤ C.
From (38) and (39), we obtain that
N∑
i=1
E
∫ ∞
r
e−ρtxTi (t− r)eA
T rQeArxi(t− r)dt ≤ NC.
This together with A3) implies that
N∑
i=1
E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt‖xi(t)‖2dt < NC,
which gives (33). From this with Theorem 4.1,
N∑
i=1
E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
(‖x˜i(t)‖2 + ‖u˜i(t)‖2)dt < NC.
By a similar argument to the proof of Theorem 3.3 com-
bined with Lemma 4.2, the conclusion follows. ✷
If A3) is replaced by A3′), the decentralized control (21)
still has asymptotic social optimality.
Corollary 2 Assume that A1)-A2), A3′) hold. The de-
centralized control (21) is asymptotically social optimal.
Proof. Without loss of generality, we simply as-
sume A + G = diag{A1,A2}, where A1 − (ρ/2)I is
Hurwitz, and −(A2 − (ρ/2)I) is Hurwitz (If nece-
ssary, we may apply a nonsingular linear trans-
formation as in the proof of Theorem 4.3). Write
x(N) = [zT1 , z
T
2 ] and Q
1/2(I − Γ) = [S1, S2] such
that
∥∥(I − Γ)x(N)(t)∥∥2
Q
= ‖S1z1(t) + S2z2(t)‖2,
and (A2 − (ρ/2)I, S2) is observable. By the proof
of Theorem 4.1 or [19], E
∫∞
0
e−ρt‖u(N)(t)‖2dt < ∞
implies E
∫∞
0 e
−ρt‖z1(t)‖2dt < ∞, which together
with (35) gives E
∫∞
0 e
−ρt‖S2z2(t)‖2dt < ∞. This
and the observability of (A2 − (ρ/2)I, S2) leads to
E
∫∞
0 e
−ρt‖z2(t)‖2dt <∞. Thus,E
∫∞
0 e
−ρt‖x(N)(t)‖2dt
<∞. The other parts of the proof are similar to that of
Theorem 4.5. ✷
For the case that Q are indefinite, we have the following
result of asymptotic optimality.
Theorem 4.6 Let A1)-A2), A3′′) hold. Assume (22)-
(23) admit negative definite solutions P− < 0 and Π− <
0, respectively. Then, the set of decentralized control in
(21) is asymptotically socially optimal. Furthermore, if
{xi0} have the same variance, then the asymptotic aver-
age social optimum is given by
lim
N→∞
1
N
Jsoc(uˆ)=E
[‖xi0−x¯0‖2P+‖x¯0‖2Π+2sT (0)x¯0]+q∞,
where
q∞ =
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
[‖σ(t)‖2P + ‖σ(t)‖2Π
− ‖BT s(t)‖2R−1 + 2sT (t)f(t)
]
dt. (40)
Proof. From the above assumptions and Theorem 4.4,
the Riccati equation (22) admits a ρ-stabilizing solution
P and a negative definite solution P−; (23) has a ρ-
stabilizing solution Π and a negative definite solution
Π−. By a similar argument in the proof of Lemma 3.1,
we obtain for any u ∈ Uc,
Jsoc(u)
=
N∑
i=1
E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
(
‖xi − x(N)‖2Q + ‖x(N)‖2Q−Ξ + ‖η‖2Q
− 2ηTQ(I − Γ)xi + ‖ui − u(N)‖2R + ‖u(N)‖2R
)
dt
=
N∑
i=1
E
[‖xi0 − x(N)(0)‖2P− + ‖x(N)(0)‖2Π−
+ 2sT (0)x(N)(0)
]− lim
T→∞
N∑
i=1
e−ρTE
[‖x(N)(T )‖2Π−
+ ‖xi(T )− x(N)(T )‖2P− + 2sT (T )x(N)(T )
]
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+N∑
i=1
E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
(∥∥u(N) +R−1BTΠ−x(N)∥∥2
R
+
∥∥ui − u(N) +R−1BTP−(xi − x(N))∥∥2R
)
dt+ q∞.
By [39, Theorem 8], the centralized optimal control ex-
ists and the optimal state is ρ-stable. Thus, we only need
to consider the following control set
U ′c =
{
(u1, · · · , uN )|ui(t) is adapted to Ft,
E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt‖xi(t)‖2dt <∞, ∀i
}
.
For any u ∈ U ′c satisfying Jsoc(u) ≤ NC, we have
Jsoc(u)
=
N∑
i=1
E
[‖xi0 − x(N)(0)‖2P + ‖x(N)(0)‖2Π + 2sT (0)x¯0]
+
N∑
i=1
E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
(∥∥ui−u(N)+R−1BTP (xi−x(N))∥∥2R
+
∥∥u(N) +R−1BTΠx(N)∥∥2
R
)
dt+ q∞ ≤ NC.
(41)
Denote v(N) = u(N) +R−1BTΠx(N). From (1),
dx(N)(t) =(A+G−BR−1BTΠ)x(N)(t)dt
+Bv(N)(t)dt +
1
N
N∑
i=1
σ(t)dWi(t).
By [19], there exists C1, C2 > 0 such that
E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt‖x(N)‖2dt ≤ C1E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt‖v(N)‖2 + C2.
This together with (41) gives
N∑
i=1
E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt(‖x(N)‖2 + ‖u(N)‖2)dt
=NE
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt(‖x(N)‖2 + ‖v(N) −R−1BTΠx(N)‖2)dt
≤NC3E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt‖v(N)‖2 +NC4 ≤ NC. (42)
Similarly, we have
N∑
i=1
E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt(‖xi − x(N)‖2 + ‖ui − u(N)‖2)dt ≤ NC.
From this and (42),
N∑
i=1
E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt(‖xi‖2 + ‖ui‖2)dt ≤ NC.
The remainder of the proof can follow by that of The-
orem 3.3. For the case that {xi0} have the same vari-
ance, from (18), the asymptotic average social optimum
(limN→∞ 1N Jsoc(uˆ)) is given by E
[‖xi0−x¯0‖2P+‖x¯0‖2Π+
2sT (0)x¯0
]
+ q∞. ✷
Remark 4.3 The work [21] investigated mean field LQ
problem (P) with Q ≥ 0. To obtain asymptotic social op-
timality, they need Q > 0 and I − Γ is nonsingular. In
Corollary 2, we have loosed the assumption to A3′), i.e.,
(A − (ρ/2)I,√Q) and (A − (ρ/2)I,√Q(I − Γ)) are de-
tectable. In Theorem 4.6, we further give the condition
for the case of indefinite Q. Particularly, for the scalar
case, the condition is equivalent to (29)-(30). It can be
verified that the assumption Q > 0 and I − Γ is nonsin-
gular implies (29)-(30), but the converse is not true.
4.3 Comparison to previous solutions
In this section, we compare the proposed decentralized
control laws with the feedback decentralized strategies
in previous works.
We first introduce a definition from [4].
Definition 4.1 For a control problem with an admis-
sible control set U , a control law u ∈ U is said to be a
representation of another control u∗ ∈ U if
(i) they both generate the same unique state trajectory,
and
(ii) they both have the same open-loop value on this tra-
jectory.
For Problem (P), let f = 0, and G = 0. In [21, Theorem
4.3], the decentralized control laws are given by
u˘i(t) = −R−1BT (Pxi(t) + s¯(t)), i = 1, · · · , N, (43)
whereP is the stabilizing solution of (22), and s¯ = K¯x†+
φ. Here K¯ satisfies
ρK¯ = K¯A¯+ A¯T K¯ − K¯BR−1BT K¯T − Ξ,
and x†, φ ∈ Cρ/2([0,∞),Rn) are given by
dx¯†
dt
= A¯x¯†(t)−BR−1BT (K¯x¯†(t) + φ(t)), x¯†(0) = x¯0,
dφ
dt
= − [A−BR−1BT (P + K¯)− ρI]φ(t) + η¯(t),
in which A¯ = A − BR−1BTP and φ(0) is to be deter-
mined by φ ∈ Cρ/2([0,∞),Rn). By comparing this with
(23)-(25), one can obtain that K¯ = Π − P , x¯ = x¯† and
φ = s. From the above discussion, we have the equiva-
lence of the two sets of decentralized control laws.
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Proposition 4.1 The set of decentralized control laws
{uˆ1, · · · , uˆN} in (21) is a representation of {u˘1, · · · , u˘N}
given by (43).
Remark 4.4 The work [21] studied the problem (P)
with Q ≥ 0 by the fixed-point approach. In Theorem 4.3,
they have shown that the fixed-point equation admits a
unique solution, when (A−(ρ/2)I,√Q) is detectable and
Ξ = ΓTQ + QΓ − ΓTQΓ ≤ 0. In fact, the above as-
sumption is merely a sufficient condition to ensure A3′)
(A− (ρ/2)I,
√
Q− Ξ) is detectable).
Remark 4.5 The work [24] investigated asymptotic
solvability of mean field LQ games by the re-scaling
method. They considered (1)-(2) with Q ≥ 0 and derived
a low-dimensional ordinary differential equation system
by dynamic programming. Actually, the method proposed
in this paper can be viewed as a type of direct approach.
Different from [24], we tackle directly high-dimensional
FBSDEs along the line of maximum principle.
5 Numerical Examples
Now, two numerical examples are given to illustrate the
effectiveness of the proposed decentralized control.
We first consider a scalar system with 30 agents in
Problem (P). Take A = 0.8, B = R = 1, Q = −0.1, G =
−0.2, f(t) = 1, σ(t) = 0.2, ρ = 0.6,Γ = 0.2, η = 5
in (1)-(2). The initial states of 50 agents are taken
independently from a normal distribution N(5, 0.3).
Note that B 6= 0, and A¯ + G − ρ2I = −0.5873 < 0.
Then A1)-A2) hold. Since M1 =
[
0.5 1
−0.1 −0.5
]
,M2 =
[
0.3 1
−0.064 −0.3
]
have no eigenvalues on the imaginary
axis, A3′′) also holds. Under the control law (21), the
trajectories of x¯ and xˆ(N) in Problem (P) are shown in
Fig. 1. It can be seen that x¯ and xˆ(N) coincide well, which
illustrate the consistency of mean field approximations.
0 2 4 6 8 10
time
1
2
3
4
5
xˆ(N )
x¯
Fig. 1. Curves of x¯ and xˆ(N).
Denote ǫ =
∣∣∣ 1N Jsoc(uˆ) − 1N infu∈Uc Jsoc(u)∣∣∣. By Theo-
rems 3.3 and 4.6, we obtain ǫ =
∫∞
0
e−ρt‖BTK(x(N)(t)−
x¯(t))‖2R−1dt. The cost gap ǫ is demonstrated in Fig. 2
where the agent number N grows from 1 to 200.
0 50 100 150 200
N
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
ǫ
Fig. 2. Curves of ǫ with resect to N .
Finally, we consider the 2-dimensional case of Prob-
lem (P). Take parameters as follows: A =
[
0.1 0
−1 0.2
]
,
B =
[
1
1
]
, G =
[
−0.5 0
0 −0.3
]
, Q =
[
1 0
0 1
]
, Γ =
[
1 0
1 1
]
, R =
[
1 0
0 1
]
, η =
[
0
0.5
]
, f = [1 1]T and
σ = [0.5 0.5]T . Denote xˆi(t) = [xˆ
1
i (t) xˆ
2
i (t)]
T . Both of
xˆ1i (0) and xˆ
2
i (0) are taken independently from a normal
distribution N(5, 0.5). Under the control laws (21), the
trajectories of xˆ1i and xˆ
2
i , i = 1, · · · , N are shown in Figs.
3 and 4, respectively. The curves of xˆ1i , i = 1, · · · , 30
soon converge to 0 with some fluctuation. The curves of
xˆ2i , i = 1, · · · , 30 first decrease and then grow up before
the time 40. After a period of time, they converge to a
constant, which verify the ρ-stability of agents.
0 20 40 60 80
time
-2
0
2
4
6
8
xˆ
1 i
,
i
=
1
,
2
,
·
·
·
,
3
0
.
Fig. 3. Curves of xˆ1i , i = 1, · · · , 30.
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0 20 40 60 80
time
0
5
10
15
20
xˆ
2 i
,
i
=
1
,
2
,
·
·
·
,
3
0
.
Fig. 4. Curves of xˆ2i , i = 1, · · · , 30.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have considered uniform stabiliza-
tion and social optimality for mean field LQ multiagent
systems. For finite- and infinite- horizon problems, we
design the decentralized control laws by decoupling
FBSDEs, respectively, which are further shown to be
asymptotically optimal. Some equivalent conditions are
further given for uniform stabilization of the systems in
different cases. Finally, we compare such decentralized
control laws with the asymptotic optimal strategies in
previous works.
An interesting generalization is to consider mean field
LQ control systems with heterogeneous coefficients by
the direct approach [16].Also, the variational analysis
may be applied to construct decentralized control laws
for the nonlinear social control model.
A Proof of Theorem 3.3
To prove Theorem 3.3, we need a lemma.
Lemma A.1 Let A1) hold. Assume that (11) and (12)
admit a solution, respectively. Under the control (16), we
have
max
0≤t≤T
E‖xˆ(N)(t)− x¯(t)‖2 = O(1/N). (A.1)
Proof. It follows by (17) that
dxˆ(N)(t) =
[
(A¯(t) +G)xˆ(N)(t)−BR−1BT (K(t)x¯(t)
+ s(t)) + f(t)
]
dt+
1
N
N∑
i=1
σ(t)dWi(t).
where A¯(t) = A−BR−1BTP (t). From (15), we have
xˆ(N)(t)− x¯(t) = Φ(t)[xˆ(N)(0)− x¯(0)]
+
1
N
N∑
i=1
∫ t
0
Φ(t− τ)σ(τ)dWi(τ),
(A.2)
where Φ satisfies Φ˙ = (A¯(t)+G)Φ(t), Φ(0) = I. By A1),
one can obtain
E
∥∥xˆ(N)(t)− x¯(t)∥∥2 ≤∥∥2Φ(t)∥∥2{E∥∥xˆ(N)(0)− x¯0∥∥2
+
1
N
∫ t
0
∥∥Φ(τ)σ(τ)∥∥2dτ}
≤ 2
N
∥∥Φ(t)∥∥2{ max
1≤i≤N
E‖xˆi0‖2
+
∫ T
0
∥∥Φ(τ)σ(τ)∥∥2dτ},
(A.3)
which completes the proof. ✷
Proof of Theorem 3.3. Note that infu∈L2
F
(0,T ;Rnr) J
F
soc(u) ≤
JFsoc(uˆ). To obtain
1
N
JFsoc(uˆ) ≤
1
N
inf
u∈L2
F
(0,T ;Rnr)
JFsoc(u) +O(
1√
N
),
we only need to prove for any u ∈ U ′ ∆= {u ∈
L2F(0, T ;R
nr) : JFsoc(u) ≤ JFsoc(uˆ)}, the following holds:
1
N
JFsoc(uˆ) ≤
1
N
JFsoc(u) + O(
1√
N
).
We now show that for u ∈ U ′,∑Ni=1 E ∫ T0 e−ρt(‖xi(t)‖2+
‖ui(t)‖2)dt < NC2. By Lemma 3.1, (P1) is uniformly
convex which gives there exists δ0 > 0 such that
δ0
N∑
i=1
E
∫ T
0
e−ρt‖ui(t)‖2dt− C ≤ JFsoc(u).
Since JFsoc(uˆ) < NC1, we have J
F
soc(u) < NC1, which
implies
∑N
i=1 E
∫ T
0
e−ρt‖ui(t)‖2dt < NC. This leads to
E
∫ T
0
e−ρt‖u(N)‖2dt ≤ 1
N
N∑
i=1
E
∫ T
0
e−ρt‖ui‖2dt < C,
where u(N) = 1N
∑N
i=1 ui. By (1),
dx(N)(t) =
[
(A+G)x(N)(t) +Bu(N)(t) + f(t)
]
dt
+
1
N
N∑
i=1
σ(t)dWi(t),
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which implies max0≤t≤T E‖x(N)(t)‖2 ≤ C. Note that
xi(t) = e
Atxi0+
∫ t
0
eA(t−τ)[Gx(N)(τ)+Bui(τ)+f(τ)]dτ.
We have
N∑
i=1
E
∫ T
0
e−ρt‖xi(t)‖2dt
≤ C
( N∑
i=1
E‖xi0‖2 +N max
0≤t≤T
E‖x(N)(t)‖2
+
N∑
i=1
E
∫ T
0
e−ρt‖ui(t)‖2dt
)
< NC2.
(A.4)
By (15) and (17), we obtain that
E
∫ T
0
e−ρt
(‖xˆi(t)‖2+‖uˆi(t)‖2+‖x¯(t)‖2)dt < C. (A.5)
Let x˜i = xi − xˆi, u˜i = ui − uˆi and x˜(N) = 1N
∑N
i=1 x˜i.
Then by (1) and (17),
dx˜i(t) = (Ax˜i(t) +Gx˜
(N)(t) +Bu˜i(t))dt, x˜i(0) = 0.
(A.6)
From (3), JFsoc(u) =
∑N
i=1(J
F
i (uˆ) + J˜
F
i (u˜) + Ii), where
J˜Fi (u˜)
∆
= E
∫ T
0
e−ρt
[‖x˜i(t)− Γx˜(N)(t)‖2Q + ‖u˜i(t)‖2R]dt,
Ii = 2E
∫ T
0
e−ρt
[(
xˆi(t)− Γxˆ(N)(t)− η(t)
)T
Q
× (x˜i(t)− Γx˜(N)(t))+ uˆTi (t)Ru˜i(t)]dt.
By Lemma 3.1 and Proposition 3.1, J˜Fi (u˜) ≥ 0. We only
need to prove 1N
∑N
i=1 Ii = O( 1√N ). By direct computa-
tions, one can obtain
N∑
i=1
Ii =
N∑
i=1
2E
∫ T
0
e−ρt
{
x˜Ti
[
Q(xˆi − Γx¯− η)
− ΓTQ((I − Γ)x¯− η)] + N∑
i=1
uˆTi Ru˜i
}
dt
+
N∑
i=1
2E
∫ T
0
e−ρt(xˆ(N) − x¯)TΞx˜idt.
(A.7)
By (11)-(13), (A.6) and Itoˆ’s formula,
0 = E
∫ T
0
N∑
i=1
e−ρt
{
− x˜Ti
[
Qxˆi −Q(Γx¯+ η)
− ΓTQ ((I − Γ)x¯ − η) ]− uˆTi Ru˜i)}dt
+NE
∫ T
0
e−ρt(xˆ(N) − x¯)T (GTP + PG)x˜(N)dt.
From this and (A.7), we obtain
1
N
N∑
i=1
Ii =2E
∫ T
0
e−ρt(xˆ(N)(t)− x¯(t))T
× (Ξ +GTP + PG)x˜(N)(t)dt.
By Lemma A.1, (A.4) and (A.5), we obtain
∣∣∣ 1
N
N∑
i=1
Ii
∣∣∣2 ≤CE∫ T
0
e−ρt‖xˆ(N)(t)− x¯(t)‖2dt
× E
∫ T
0
e−ρt‖x˜(N)(t)‖2dt,
which implies | 1N
∑N
i=1 Ii| = O(1/
√
N).
Moreover, by (11), (14) and direct calculations,
JFsoc(uˆ)
=
N∑
i=1
E
∫ T
0
e−ρt
(∥∥xˆi − Γxˆ(N) − η∥∥2Q + ‖uˆi‖2R
)
dt
=
N∑
i=1
E
∫ T
0
e−ρt
(
‖xˆi‖2Q + ‖xˆ(N)‖2Ξ + ‖η‖2Q
− 2ηTQ(I − Γ)xˆi + ‖uˆi‖2R
)
dt
=
N∑
i=1
E
∫ T
0
e−ρt
(
‖xˆi − xˆ(N)‖2Q + ‖xˆ(N)‖2Q−Ξ + ‖η‖2Q
− 2ηTQ(I − Γ)xˆi + ‖uˆi − uˆ(N)‖2R + ‖uˆ(N)‖2R
)
dt
=
N∑
i=1
E
[‖xi0−x(N)(0)‖2P+‖x(N)(0)‖2Π+2sT (0)x(N)(0)]
+
N∑
i=1
E
∫ T
0
e−ρt
(∥∥uˆi−uˆ(N) +R−1BTP (xˆi−xˆ(N))∥∥2R
+
∥∥uˆ(N) +R−1BTΠxˆ(N)∥∥2
R
)
dt+ qT
=
N∑
i=1
E
[‖xi0 − x(N)(0)‖2P + ‖x(N)(0)‖2Π
+ 2sT (0)x(N)(0)
]
+NqT +NǫT ,
where qT and ǫT are given by (19)-(20). ✷
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B Proofs of Lemma 4.2 and Theorem 4.1
Proof of Lemma 4.2. From (A.2), we have
E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt‖xˆ(N)(t)− x¯(t)‖2dt
≤ 2E
∫ ∞
0
∥∥∥e(A¯+G− ρ2 I)t∥∥∥2 ∥∥xˆ(N)(0)− x¯(0)∥∥2dt
+ 2E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
1
N
∥∥∥∥
∫ t
0
e(A¯+G)(t−τ)σdWi(τ)
∥∥∥∥
2
dt
≤ 2
N
∫ ∞
0
∥∥∥e(A¯+G− ρ2 I)t∥∥∥2 E∥∥ max
1≤i≤N
xˆi(0)
∥∥2dt
+
C
N
E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρτ‖σ‖2
∫ ∞
τ
∥∥e(A¯+G¯− ρ2 I)(t−τ)∥∥2dtdτ
≤ O(1/N).
✷
Proof of Theorem 4.1. By A1)-A3), Lemmas 4.1 and 4.2,
we obtain that x¯ ∈ Cρ/2([0,∞),Rn) and
E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
(∥∥xˆ(N)(t)− x¯(t)∥∥2) dt = O( 1
N
),
which further gives that E
∫∞
0 e
−ρt‖xˆ(N)(t)‖2dt < ∞.
Denote g
∆
= −BR−1BT ((Π−P )x¯+s)+Gx(N)+f . Then
xˆi(t) = e
A¯txˆi0+
∫ t
0
eA¯(t−τ)g(τ)dτ+
∫ t
0
eA¯(t−τ)σdWi(τ).
(B.1)
Note that A¯− ρ2I is Hurwitz. By Schwarz’s inequality,
E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt‖xˆi(t)‖2dt
≤3E
∫ ∞
0
∥∥∥e(A¯− ρ2 I)t∥∥∥2 ‖xˆi0‖2dt
+ 3E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρtt
∫ t
0
∥∥∥eA¯(t−τ)g(τ)∥∥∥2dτdt
+ 3E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
∫ t
0
tr[eA¯
T (t−τ)σT (τ)σ(τ)eA¯(t−τ)]dτdt
≤C + 3E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρτ‖g(τ)‖2
∫ ∞
τ
t
∥∥e(A¯− ρ2 I)(t−τ)∥∥2dtdτ
+ 3CE
∫ ∞
0
e−ρτ‖σ(τ)‖2
∫ ∞
τ
∥∥e(A¯− ρ2 I)(t−τ)∥∥2dtdτ
≤C1
This with (21) completes the proof. ✷
C Proofs of Theorems 4.2 and 4.3
Proof of Theorem 4.2. i)⇒ ii). By (17),
dE[xˆi]
dt
= A¯E[xˆi(t)]−BR−1BT ((Π− P )x¯(t) + s(t))
+GE[xˆ(N)(t)] + f(t), E[xˆi(0)] = x¯0.
(C.1)
It follows from A1) that E[xˆi(t)] = E[xˆj(t)] =
E[xˆ(N)(t)], j 6= i. By comparing (25) and (C.1), we
obtain E[xˆi(t)] = x¯(t). Note ‖x¯(t)‖2 =
∥∥Exˆi(t)∥∥2 ≤
E‖xˆi(t)‖2. It follows from (28) that∫ ∞
0
e−ρt‖x¯(t)‖2dt <∞. (C.2)
By (25), we have
x¯(t) =e(A+G−BR
−1BTΠ)t
[
x¯0
+
∫ t
0
e−(A+G−BR
−1BTΠ)τh(τ)dτ
]
,
where h = −BR−1BT s + f . By the arbitrariness of x¯0
with (C.2) we obtain that A + G − BR−1BTΠ − ρ2I is
Hurwitz. That is, (A+G− ρ2I, B) is stabilizable. By [2],
(23) admits a unique solution such that Π > 0. Note that
E[x(N)(t)]2 ≤ 1N
∑N
i=1 E[xˆ
2
i (t)]. Then from (28) we have
E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
∥∥xˆ(N)(t)∥∥2dt <∞. (C.3)
This leads to E
∫∞
0
e−ρt‖g(t)‖2dt < ∞, where g= −
BR−1BT ((Π−P )x¯+s)+Gxˆ(N)+f . By (B.1), we obtain
E‖xˆi(t)‖2 = E
∥∥∥∥eA¯t
(
xi0 +
∫ t
0
e−A¯τg(τ)dτ
)∥∥∥∥
2
+ E
∫ t
0
tr
[
σT (τ)e(A¯
T+A¯)(t−τ)σ(τ)
]
dτ.
By (28) and the arbitrariness of xi0 we obtain that A¯− ρ2I
is Hurwitz, i.e., (A − ρ2I, B) is stabilizable. By [2], (22)
admits a unique solution such that P > 0.
From (C.2) and (C.3),
E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
∥∥xˆ(N)(t)− x¯(t)∥∥2dt <∞. (C.4)
On the other hand, (A.2) gives
E
∥∥xˆ(N)(t)− x¯(t)∥∥2 = E∥∥e(A¯+G)t[xˆ(N)(0)− x¯0]∥∥2
+
1
N
∫ t
0
tr
[
σT (τ)e(A¯
T+GT+A¯+G)(t−τ)σ(τ)
]
dτ.
By (C.4) and the arbitrariness of xi0, i = 1, · · · , N , we
obtain that A¯+G− ρ2I is Hurwitz.
(ii)⇒(iii). Let V (t) = e−ρty¯T (t)Πy¯(t), where y¯ satisfies
˙¯y(t) = (A+G)y¯(t) +Bu¯(t), y¯(0) = y¯0.
Denote V by V ∗ when u¯ = u¯∗ = −R−1BTΠy¯. By (23),
dV ∗
dt
=y¯T (t)
[ − ρΠ+ (A+G−BR−1BTΠ)TΠ
14
+Π(A+G−BR−1BTΠ)]y¯(t)
=y¯T (t)
[ − (Q− Ξ)−ΠBR−1BTΠ]y¯(t) ≤ 0.
Note that V ∗ ≥ 0. Then limt→∞ V ∗(t) exists, which
implies
lim
t0→∞
[V ∗(t0)− V ∗(t0 + T )] = 0. (C.5)
RewriteΠ(t) in (14) byΠT (t). Thenwe haveΠT+t0(t0) =
ΠT (0). By (14),
∫ T+t0
t0
e−ρt(‖y¯(t)‖2Q−Ξ + ‖u¯(t)‖2R)dt
=e−ρt0 y¯T (t0)ΠT+t0(t0)y¯(t0)
+
∫ T
0
e−ρt
∥∥u¯(t) +R−1BTΠT+t0(t0)y¯(t)∥∥2Rdt
≥e−ρt0
∥∥y¯(t0)∥∥2ΠT+t0(t0) = e−ρt0∥∥y¯(t0)∥∥2ΠT (0).
This with (C.5) implies
lim
t0→∞
e−ρt0
∥∥y¯(t0)∥∥2ΠT (0)
≤ lim
t0→∞
∫ T+t0
t0
e−ρt(‖y¯(t)‖2Q−Ξ + ‖u¯∗(t)‖2R)dt
= lim
t0→∞
[V ∗(t0)− V ∗(t0 + T )] = 0.
By A3), one can get that there exists T > 0 such
that ΠT (0) > 0 (See e.g. [45], [46]). Thus, we
have limt→∞ e−ρt
∥∥y¯(t)∥∥2 = 0, which implies that
(A +G − ρ2I, B) is stabilizable. Similarly, we can show
(A− ρ2I, B) is stabilizable.
(iii)⇒(i). This part has been proved in Theorem 4.1. ✷
Proof of Theorem 4.3. (iii)⇒(i). From [2], (22) and (23)
admit unique solutions P ≥ 0,Π ≥ 0 such that A −
BR−1BTP − ρ2I and A − BR−1BTΠ − ρ2I are Hur-
witz, respectively. Thus, there exists a unique s(0) such
that s ∈ Cρ/2([0,∞),Rn). It is straightforward that
x¯ ∈ Cρ/2([0,∞),Rn). By the argument in the proof of
Theorem 4.1, (i) follows. (i)⇒(ii). The proof of this part
is similar to that of (i)⇒(ii) in Theorem 4.2.
(ii)⇒(iii). Since Π ≥ 0, there exists an orthogonal U
such that UTΠU =
[
0 0
0 Π2
]
, where Π2 > 0. From (22),
ρUTΠU =(UT A¯U)TUTΠU + UTΠUUT A¯U
+ UT Q¯U, (C.6)
where A¯
∆
= A + G − ΠBR−1BTΠ, Q¯ = Q − Ξ +
ΠBR−1BTΠ. Denote
UT A¯U =
[
A¯11 A¯12
A¯21 A¯22
]
, UT Q¯U =
[
Ξ11 Ξ12
Ξ21 Ξ22
]
.
By pre- and post-multiplying by ξT and ξ where ξ =
[ξT1 , 0]
T , it follows that
0 = ρξTUTΠUξ = ξTUT Q¯Uξ.
From the arbitrariness of ξ1, we obtain Q¯11 = 0. Since
Q¯ is semi-positive definite, then Q¯12 = Q¯21 = 0, and
Q¯22 ≥ 0. By comparing each block matrix of both sides
of (C.6), we obtain A¯21 = 0. It follows from (C.6) that
ρΠ2 = Π2A¯22 + A¯
T
22Π2 + Q¯22. (C.7)
Let ζ = [ζT1 , ζ
T
2 ]
T = UT y¯∗, where y¯∗ satisfies ˙¯y∗ = A¯y¯∗.
Then we have
ζ˙1 = A¯11ζ1 + A¯12ζ2,
ζ˙2 = A¯22ζ2.
By Lemma 4.1 of [40], the detectability of (A+G, (Q−
Ξ)1/2) implies the detectability of (A¯, Q¯1/2). Take ζ(0) =
ξ = [ξT1 , 0]
T . Then Q¯1/2y¯ = Q¯1/2Uζ = 0, which together
with the detectability of (A¯, Q¯1/2) implies ζ1 → 0 and
A¯11 is Hurwitz. Denote S(t) = e
−ρtζT2 Π2ζ2. By (C.7),
S(T )− S(0) = −
∫ T
0
ζ2(t)
T Q¯22ζ2(t)dt ≤ 0,
which implies limt→∞ S(t) exists. By a similar ar-
gument with the proof of Theorem 4.2, we obtain
limt0→∞ e
−ρt0∥∥ζ2(t0)∥∥2Π2,T (0) = 0 and Π2,T (0) > 0,
which gives ζ2 → 0 and A¯22 is Hurwitz. This with the
fact that A¯11 is Hurwitz gives that ζ is stable, which
leads to (iii). ✷
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